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Abstract
Much research has focused on the deleterious effects of free-riding in public goods
games, and a variety of mechanisms that suppresses cheating behaviour. Here we argue
that under certain conditions cheating behaviour can be beneficial to the population. In
a public goods game, cheaters do not pay for the cost of the public goods, yet they
receive the benefit. Although this free-riding harms the entire population in the long
run, the success of cheaters may aid the population when there is a common enemy that
antagonizes both cooperators and cheaters. Here we study models in which an immune
system antagonizes a cooperating pathogen. We investigate three population dynamics
models, and determine under what conditions the presence of cheaters help defeat the
immune system. The mechanism of action is that a polymorphism of cheaters and
altruists optimizes the average growth rate. Our results give support for a possible
synergy between cooperators and cheaters in ecological public goods games.
Introduction
The sociology of microorganisms is an important and growing field of study [36], and
altruism and conflict, as applied to biofilm evolution, are important factors within its
domain [4, 37]. Public goods benefit every agent, but more so the free-riders that use
them without contributing. An example is siderophore production in bacterial
population [7]. Iron is an import and scare resource for bacteria living in hosts. Thus,
they produce siderophores that bind to iron in hemoglobin and other molecules to form
iron-siderophore complexes. The bacteria then absorb these complexes. Some bacteria
cheat, by not producing (or producing fewer) siderophores. They absorb the
iron-siderophore complexes produced by the community as a whole, without
contributing to the cost [3]. The lower operating cost allows cheating strains to
reproduce faster, dominate the population, and lead to an iron-deprived community.
There are several questions that arise from this social dilemma: how can altruists
survive with competing cheaters? What role do cheaters play within the infection? If
altruists and cheaters can coexist, how do they interact and evolve?
Ecological public goods games have been shown to facilitate cooperation where
population density depends on average payoff [18, 19]. Other mechanisms proposed to
facilitate altruism include kin selection [16,28], and reciprocal altruism [1].
Experimental studies of altruistic siderophore production in Pseudomas aeruginosa have
shown that higher levels of cooperation are observed in higher relatedness communities.
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More localized competition selects for lower levels of siderophore production.
Furthermore there is a significant interaction between relatedness and the scale of
competition, with relatedness having less effect when the scale of competition is more
local [15]. Studies of P. aeruginosa have shown another solution, metabolic constraints
on social cheating. Quorum sensing can control both these public goods (extracellular
proteases) and private goods (cellular enzymes) [10]. Additionally, it is well known that
space can facilitate cooperation and coexistence of cooperators and defectors. This
effect has been shown in both theoretical models [31] and in experimental bacterial
populations [21,30]. A review of altruism in microbial communities that explore a
collection of these mechanism and issue is found in [9].
A variety of interesting pathogen-immune system models has been explored in the
literature [14,23,24,27]. Here, we extend the model in [24] by the incorporation of a
public goods game, and interpret their model as a general host-pathogen model. We
explore both linear and Monod public good growth function, and adapt two other
canonical two-species growth models into our models that are adaptations of the logistic
equation [8]. Depending on the specific growth source used by the microbes, empirical
data either supports a linear or Monod growth rate function [26]. We find that the
models employing the Monod function exhibit a synergy between altruists and cheaters
where the public good is more efficiently used to increase the growth rate of the entire
population of pathogens. With this effect, the pathogens can overcome the immune
response of the host whereas wholly altruistic or cheating populations cannot.
Methods
Let xa and xc be the numbers of altruists and cheaters, respectively, X = xa + xc be
the total pathogen population, and y be the number of immune system effectors. The
growth rate of the cheater pathogens, rc, is the sum of the basal growth rate, β, and the
benefit from the public good, g(xa/X), which is a function of the proportion of the
population that are altruists. We explored two public good growth functions, linear (1)
and Monod growth (2):
g
(xa
X
)
=
αxa
X
, (1)
g
(xa
X
)
=
αxa/X
Kα + xa/X
, (2)
where α is the maximum growth rate provided by the public good, and Kα is the half
velocity constant. The growth rate for altruists is ra = rc − c, where c is the cost of
producing the public good. Let K be the carrying capacity and r¯ = (raxa + rcxc)/X be
the average rate of growth. In the absence of an immune response and other
complications, it is standard to describe the growth and competition of bacteria by
logistic dynamics [8]. Here we separately consider three models in this class: r/K
selection (5), weak selection (6), and interspecific competition (7).
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x˙a = raxaFa(xa, xc), (3)
x˙c = rcxcFc(xa, xc), (4)
Fi(xa, xc) =
(
1− X
K
)
, (5)
Fi(xa, xc) =
(
1− X
riK
)
, (6)
Fi(xa, xc) =
(
1− r¯X
riK
)
. (7)
In r/K selection (5), the success of one phenotype over the other is determined by
both the growth rates and carrying capacities. There is a trade-off between ri and K:
when close to the carrying capacity, K determines selection. And, when the population
is small, ri determines selection. In weak selection (6), the population is limited by riK,
and this trade-off does not exist. Finally, in interspecific competition (7), the
phenotypes compete against one another for resources. A phenotype with a larger
growth rate will curtail the carrying capacity of its competitor.
In our model, the immune system does not differentiate between cooperating and
free riding pathogens, and thus y˙ depends only on X. The immune system’s effectors,
which kill foreign cells, are produced at a basal rate, σ, and die at a rate, δ. The
pathogen free host thus has an equilibrium y∗ = σ/δ. In the presence of a pathogen, the
production of immune agents is determined by the nonlinear activation function,
ρyX/(η +X), and immune agents are exhausted at a rate, µX. The immune system
attacks the pathogen, and reduces their number at a rate, xiy. The dynamics of this
system are governed by the following system of equations:
x˙a = raxaF (xa, xc)− xay, (8)
x˙c = rcxcF (xa, xc)− xcy, (9)
y˙ = y
(
ρX
η +X
− µX − δ
)
+ σ. (10)
This model is based on [24], where it was shown to agree with empirical observations.
Here we have generalized it to include bacteria with two kinds of social behaviour. A
summary of the parameters, variables, and their values (from [24]) can be found in
Table 1. We have chosen the values of α, Kα, and c in Table 1 to highlight the
synergistic behaviour of cheaters and altruists, since the synergy is not present
throughout parameter space.
Results
Here we discuss the qualitative dynamics of immune system plus social and anti-social
bacteria, i.e. the equilibria, stability, and invariant surfaces. We follow these analyses
with simulation results that depict the synergy between altruists and cheaters, and the
effects of different parameters on this synergy.
At equilibrium, we have x˙a = x˙c, which implies that (rc − c)Fa = rcFc. In all three
models, this reduces to rc− c = rc. Thus, assuming that c > 0, there are no polymorphic
pathogen equilibria. 11 and 12 are the equilibria at these monomorphic populations for
r/K selection and inter-specific competition, and weak selection, respectively;
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Parameter/
variable
Value Definition
α 1.3088 Benefit from the public good
β 1.636 Basal growth rate
δ 0.3743 Death rate of immune agents
η 20.19 Activation parameter
K 500 Carrying capacity
Kα 0.5 Monod parameter
µ 0.00311 Inactivation rate
ρ 1.131 Activation parameter
σ 0.1181 Birth rate of immune agents
c 0.818 Cost to altruists
ra — Altruist growth rate
rc — Cheater growth rate
r¯ — Average growth rate
xa — No. of altruists
xc — No. of cheaters
X — Total pathogen population
y — No. of immune agents
Table 1. Summary definitions of parameters and variables.
xi = K
(
1− y
ri
)
, (11)
xi = K(ri − y), (12)
with ra = β + g(1)− c and rc = β (note that since r¯ = ri in a monomorphic population
of phenotype i, 11 applies for both r/K selection and interspecific competition). Since
we assume that the public good is beneficial to the pathogens in a monomorphic
altruistic population, g(1) > c =⇒ ra > rc, it can be easily seen by 11 and 12 that all
monomorphic altruist equilibria have higher pathogen counts than their monomorphic
cheater counterparts. However, in a polymorphic population,
rc = β + g(xa/X) > β + g(xa/X)− c = ra. Since the growth rate for cheaters is always
greater than the growth rate of altruists in such a case, there are no stable
monomorphic altruistic equilibria.
The model has four fixed points: the pathogen free state, a suppressed population of
pathogens (i.e. corresponds to a dormant state); a very large population of pathogens
(i.e. bacteria take over the host); and a saddle point (i.e. the bacteria are populous, but
have not taken over the host). The pathogen free state is connected to the saddle via a
stable manifold. This stable manifold, a separatrix, divides phase space into regions
where the pathogens succeed and fail. The unstable manifold spirals into the suppressed
state on one side of the separatrix, and connects to the success state on the other side.
Qualitatively, this picture is the same as in [24] with the addition of the altruist
dimension.
Fig. 1 shows the regions of suppression (gray) and success (white) of pathogens for
all the models we study. The goal here is to check whether a certain initial population
of microbes (xc, xa) succeeds in defeating the host. The line xa = X − xc (with
constant X) is overlaid to these plots to show whether changing the composition of the
population—without changing the total number of bacteria—results in a difference in
the fate of the disease.
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Interestingly, in some cases we observe that population compositions with an
intermediate number of cheaters can place the population in the successful region, while
too little or too many cheaters jeopardize the population. In other words, while neither
pure cooperation nor pure cheating leads to success, a mixture of the two does. We
observe this phenomenon in bacteria growing according to the Monod law, but not for
linear growth.
We can explain this phenomenon by examining the equations for the change in the
total population, X˙, r/K selection and interspecific competition (13), and weak
selection (14);
X˙ = r¯X
(
1− X
K
)
− yX, (13)
X˙ = r¯X − X
2
K
− yX. (14)
In linear growth, r¯ = β + (α− c)xa/X, which is an increasing function with respect to
xa (given α > c). Thus, 13 and 14 are increasing with respect to xa. Therefore, the
impact of decreasing altruists in favor of cheaters is a decrease in the total population’s
rate of growth; cheaters harm the population as a whole. However, for Monod growth,
Figure 1. A mixed population of altruists and cheaters minimizes the number of
pathogens required to overcome the immune system when growth from the public good
behaves as a Monod function (d-f). However, this behaviour is not observed when the
growth function is linear (a-c). The white and gray regions are where the pathogens
overcome and are suppressed by the immune system, respectively. The black curves are
the isoclines, xa = X − xc, where X = 10 in b and e, and X = 40, otherwise.
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we have the function
r¯ = β +
(
α
Kα + xa/X
− c
)
xa
X
(15)
with the assumption that α/(Kα + 1) > c. With respect to the proportion of altruists,
this function has a local maximum at
xa
X
=
√
αKα
c
−Kα >
√
Kα(Kα + 1)−Kα > 0. (16)
Therefore, unlike the linear growth case, the optimal growth rate will occur in the
presence of cheaters when
√
αKα/c−Kα < 1.
Fig. 2 shows the results for simulations where we varied the parameters, α (the
maximum growth rate from the public good), Kα (the half velocity constant), and c
(the cost of public good production). We ran simulations for populations of size X with
5% of the population cheaters. We incrementally increased X until the pathogens
succeeded. We then simulated a complete altruist population of size X ′ = X. If this
population was suppressed, we increased X ′ until it succeeded, and colored the graphs
by magnitude (X ′ −X)/X.
We observe that for sufficiently large α and small c, cheaters do not benefit the
population. In these cases, the public good is cheap and efficacious. However, within the
region where we observe cheater-altruist synergy, increasing α intensifies the synergistic
effect except with respect to c in interspecific competition. Figure 3 explains this effect.
Note the sharp drop in the separatrix in Figure 3; a small proportion of altruists is
beneficial to the pathogens. However, the remainder of the curve shows malign effects of
increasing the proportion of cheaters. As we increase α, this phenomenon disappears,
and we observe the same qualitative behaviour as linear growth.
Kα is negatively correlated with cheater success (Figure 2). A low half velocity
constant implies that the marginal benefit from the public good rapidly decreases as the
proportion of altruists increases. As such, cheaters permit a more efficient utilization of
the public good in the population. In the linear growth case, this effect cannot occur
because the higher the proportion of altruists, the greater the total population’s growth
rate.
We compared the separatrices for the Monod models of a population of the two
phenotypes and a population with a single phenotype with an intermediate production
of the public good in Figure 4. We plotted the population size required to overcome the
immune system given an initial proportion of altruists xa/X for the two type case, and
a single type with growth rate 15. When altruism is low, the two-type population is
optimal for the pathogens. Conversely, when altruism is high, the mixed type
population is optimal. If xa/X <
√
αKα/c−Kα, then the mixed type will outcompete
the two type case. Since, xa/X → 0 as t→∞ and 4 is a decreasing function from 0 to√
αKα/c−Kα in the two type case, while the growth rate of the mixed type will not
decrease.
Discussion
Previous studies support the hypothesis of frequency dependent selection among
cheaters and altruists [12,25,32]. Altruists are less fit in the presence of cheaters, who
outperform them. Further, average fitness is negatively correlated with the proportion
of cheaters, which reduces virulence [17,33]. Our linear growth model qualitatively
matches these empirical results. Given these observations, the question arises as to how
altruism can be facilitated. However, less discussed, is why both cheating and altruism
are prevalent, which is relevant since the prevalence of cheaters may be common [13,35].
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Figure 2. Comparison of success of a 5% cheater population vs. a pure altruist
population for varying parameters α, Kα, and c. The gray scale measures the difference
between the number of pathogens required to overcome immune suppression for the
5% cheater, X, vs. pure altruist populations, X ′, divided by X. The curves define the
envelope in which the optimal growth rate occurs for xa < 1 and the pure altruist Monod
growth rate is greater than c. Where a parameter is not varied, its value is from Table 1.
Much research has explored mechanisms by which altruism can be facilitated, yet
not how cheating can indirectly aide the population. Our approach was to explore how,
in host-pathogen ecology, if cheaters may be necessary for pathogens to overcome the
host’s immune system. Our problem is essentially a threshold Volunteer’s
Dilemma [2,11], where only if the population’s public good production is sufficient, the
group as a whole benefits. The Volunteer’s Dilemma has been studied with respect to
punishment [29], shared rewards [6], voluntary reward funds [34], and asymmetric player
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Figure 3. Comparison of varying benefits from public good growth rates (α). All curves
are in decreasing order from top to bottom of the graphs with increasing α (α = 1.5, 1.75,
2, and 2.25). As α increases, the behaviour of the model approaches that of linear growth,
i. e. a monomorphic altruistic population is optimal with respect to the pathogens.
strength [20]. Additionally, multilevel selection can favour a polymorphism of
cooperators and defectors by maximizing the group donation level when the benefit
function is sigmoid [5]. We have shown that although cheaters out-compete altruists in
a mixed population, such a population can be more virulent than a pure population of
altruists or cheaters. This unexpected phenomenon occurs due to the Monod growth
nature of the public good, as in the case of iron facilitated growth in P. aeruginosa [22].
The optimal total population growth rate may be at a mixed population. Although this
harms altruists relative to cheaters, it may permit the pathogens to resist suppression
by the immune system. Future work that studies the epidemiology of such a system
would be interesting. A mixed population is required to overcome the immune response,
during which the relative number of cheaters is increasing. However, if the carrying
capacity for altruists were to be larger than for cheaters, than at large population sizes,
the relative fitness advantage of cheaters may vanish. In this interplay, cheaters are r
selection and altruists K selection phenotypes.
This research did not consider associativity amongst the bacteria, which may come
Figure 4. Comparison of the separatrices of a polymorphic population of two types,
altruists and cheaters, at initial condition xa/X (solid curves), and a monomorphic
population with growth rate 15 (dashed curves). Below the curves, the immune system
suppresses the pathogens, and above them, it does not. For low altruism, the two-type
case outperforms the mixed type. And, for high altruism, the mixed type is optimal.
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about due to spatial effects. Future work employing associativity would be interesting,
since the degree of associativity may have surprising effects. For example, high
associativity between similar phenotypes would facilitate cooperation. However, this
would reduce the optimization of the growth rate that occurs with cheaters in the
Monod case.
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